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NOTES
THE LAW oF ENTRAPMENT IN NARcoTics ARRESTS
Illegal traffic in narcotics is a secret and nonviolent business which usually
involves only two or three persons who are all willing participants. Even at the
final retail level, where narcotics are distributed to the real victims of the illegal
busines§, sales still usually involve only two or three parties. Thus, in the usual
case, an offender need only fear accidental dealings with a law enforcement officer
or an informer for the interested authorities - a stool pigeon. This raises special
problems for law enforcement officers, because to check the illegal narcotics com-
merce they must of necessity fit themselves deceptively into its patterns of operation.
They must participate in illegal sales and rely heavily on informers, in order to
detect and apprehend narcotics violators. As a practical consequence of these
methods, entrapment is often asserted as a defense to prosecutions for violations
in this area of the law, the question being, have the law enforcement officials
stepped beyond their proper bounds?
Probably the first case in which the defense received any discussion was
United States v. Whittier,' a mail fraud case, in which a concurring judge formu-
lated a definition which distinguishes between the permissible and the forbidden,
a formula which has remained basically unchanged:
No court should . . . lend its countenance . . . to contrivances for inducing
a person to commit a crime ... [But] when the guilty intent to commit
has been formed, any one may furnish opportunities, or even lend assist-
ance, to the criminal, with the commendable purpose of exposing and
punishing him.
2
The United States Supreme Court gave its assent to the defense in Grimm v.
United States,3 also a mail fraud case. In Grimm the Court held that the mere
ordering of forbidden materials through the mails by a government agent under
an assumed name was no defense in a prosecution of the shipper, because "he
cannot plead in defense that he would not have violated the law if inquiry had not
been made of him by such government official."' 4 Likewise, the use of decoy letters
is permissible in narcotics cases.5
The limits of permissible participation have since been further elud-
dated. In Woo Wai v. United States,6 involving charges of unlawful impor-
tation of Chinese into the United States, the Court held that because government
agents "coaxed, persuaded, and urged"'7 defendant to commit the crime, his con-
viction could not stand. An agent of the Immigration Commission, suspecting that
the defendant, a merchant, possessed information as to previous unlawful importa-
tions of Chinese women into San Francisco, coaxed defendant for over a year, by
letters and conversation with him, before he agreed to enter into a scheme for
bringing Chinese across the Mexican border. The inspector explained to him the
means to be used, routes to follow, and ways to avoid arrest, until his resistance
was overcome. The Court said that
a sound public policy can be upheld only by denying the criminality
of those who are thus induced to commit acts which infringe the letter
of the criminal statutes . . . [because] the suggestion of the criminal act
came from the officers of the government. The whole scheme originated
with them.8
Although the earlier cases did not discuss the problem, a divided Supreme
1 28 Fed.Cas. 591 (No. 16,688) (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878).
2 Id. at 594-595.
3 156 U.S. 604, 611 (1895): "The fact that the person who wrote under these assumed
names and received his letters was a government detective in no manner detracts from his
guilt."
4 Id. at 610.
5 Mitchell v. United States, 143 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1944).
6 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
7 Id. at 414.
8 Id. at 415.
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Court in Sorrells v. United States,9 made explicit the theoretical basis on which
the defense of entrapment rests. A prohibition agent, posing as a tourist, ac-
companied three friends of defendant to his house. The agent told defendant they
were former members of the same division in the war. After at least three requests
by the agent during their conversation, the defendant finally procured and sold
him a half gallon of liquor. According to Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and the
majority,
The defense is available, not in the view that the accused though
guilty may go free, but that the Government cannot be permitted to
contend that he is guilty of a crime where the government officials are
the instigators of his conduct. 10
The minority, however, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, thought that the
decision "ought to be based on the inherent right of the court not to be made the
instrument of wrong,"'" rather than on the basis of statutory construction involving
reading an exception into the applicable statute "in the light of what may fairly
be deemed to be its object."12 Although it is euphemistic to call the majority's act
one of statutory construction or interpretation, they seem to have grasped the most
fundamental justification and underlying basis for the defense - that the laws
are not meant to punish persons whose guilt is significantly diminished because of
a sufficiently great temptation offered by the very persons whose mission is to pre-
vent crime.' 3 If this were not the reason for the defense, why would strict applica-
tion of the law in an entrapment situation be "so contrary to the purpose of the
law and so inconsistent with its proper enforcement,"' 4 where it is conceded that
the defendant has violated the letter of the law;' 5 why would conviction in these
cases be a wrong consummated by the use of the court's process; and why would
the prohibited police conduct be illegal or at all improper?' 6 Thus a conviction will
not be permitted in cases where
.. . the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government,
and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they
may prosecute.' 7
In the Sorrells case it was held that a jury could find that this "otherwise in-
nocent" defendant was "lured" to the commission of the crime in question "by
repeated and persistent solicitation in which he [the government agent] succeeded
by taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their experiences
as companions in arms in the World War."' 8 The crime was merely the "creature
of his [the agent's] purpose,"'19 not the sort of activity against which the criminal
laws are arrayed. Despite intelligent criticism of the view, 20 saying that the guilt
of entrapped persons is significantly lessened according to the kind of police par-
ticipation in the offense seems to justify the admittedly vague formulation used,
along with the consequent necessity for a case-by-case determination of the issue
by juries.
Sherman v. United States,2' the only other extended discussion by the Supreme
Court on the subject, reaffirmed the Sorrells theory of entrapment. In the Sherman
9 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
10 Id. at 452.
11 Id. at 456.
12 Id. at 451.
13 See Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (1960).
14 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446 (1932).
15 Id. at 445-446.
16 This question challenges the view expressed in the concurring opinion in Sorrells at
457, supra note 14.
17 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
18 Id. at 441. (Material in BRACKETS added.)
19 Ibid. (Material in BRACKETS added.)
20 Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs,
60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1107-1109 (1951).
21 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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case, the government informer took advantage of a new friendship with defendant
and the latter's sympathy for him as a fellow addict who needed drugs because
he was not responding to treatment for addiction. Entrapment was found as a
matter of law because the undisputed testimony of the prosecution's own witnesses
supported the claim of entrapment 2 The defense was not overcome by claiming
that defendant evinced a "ready complaisance" to sell to the informer, where
there was no evidence to support the claim, nor was evidence as to a nine-year-old
sales conviction and a five-year-old possession conviction sufficient to prove he had
a readiness to sell narcotics at the time he was approached.2 3 The Court did not
make this point clear, but it seems plain that if there were evidence that the accused
were himself in the trade, or that there were narcotics in his apartment, or that
he 'had made a profit on his sale to the informer, circumstances that might tend
to show a "ready complaisance," these circumstances would not justify an other-
wise illegal entrapment, but would merely go to discredit any account of govern-
ment conduct amounting to entrapment.2 4
When the defense of entrapment is held good, the government agent or in-
former involved has usually employed "extraordinary temptations or inducements"
2 5
to persuade, lure, or, as it is usually put, to induce the accused to commit the crime
in question. In one case, 26 the informer induced the accused to purchase heroin
by telling him that they were members of the same fraternal organization and
persuading him that he could make money by betting on horses injected with
heroin. However, in most cases where the defense is good, the informer or "agent"
appeals to the sympathies or misdirected humanitarianism of the defendant.
Usually the defendant will have yielded only after repeated requests,2 7 and only
to help out a friend or supposed friend,28 or even the fictitious mistress of a friend
of the informer, who is represented to be sick,29 or a friend who needs narcotics
to effect a cure,30 or to alleviate his suffering,31 or to enable him to work and support
his family. 32 Although the defendant is not usually motivated by a desire for monetary
gain, it is not necessarily fatal to the defense that the crime was committed for the
purpose of making money, rather than to help another, as long as there is in-
ducement.
3
There seems to be no reason why this inducement should have to consist en-
tirely of oral persuasion. In United States v. Silva,"4 the defense was sustained
where defendant claimed he was led into drug use by the informer, who at first
gave him drugs free of charge, later charged him five dollars per shot, which the
informer injected into his bloodstream for him, and finally when he ran out of
money tricked him into making a sale to a narcotics agent by promising him an
22 Id. at 373.
23 Id. at 375. But a criminal record of similar crimes or evidence of previous criminal
activity is relevant to rebut a claim of entrapment. See infra footnotes 73 and 74 and ac-
companying text..
24 See Young v. United States, 286 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1960); infra notes 63 and 64
and accompanying text.
25 Hamilton v. United States, 221 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1955).
26 Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942).
27 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Lutfy v. United States, 198 F.2d
760 (9th Cir. 1952); Cline v. United States, 20 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1927); Cermak v. United
States, 4 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1925).
28 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435 (1932); Cline v. United States, 20 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1927); Cermak v. United States,
4 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1925); Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128 (4th Cir. 1924).
29 Lutfy v. United States, 198 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1952).
30 Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128 (4th Cir. 1924).
31 Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933).
32 Cermak v. United States, 4 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1925).
33 Morales v. United States, 260 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1958); Hamilton v. United States,
221 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1955); Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942).
34 180 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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injection in return. The court correctly stated that this criminal activity was "the
product of the creative activity" of law enforcement officials.
35
One decision that seems clearly wrong is Henderson v. United States,3 r where
the Fifth Circuit held that if the testimony of government agents who observed the
meetings of the informer and defendant were sufficient to show sales of narcotics,
this established "without more that the defendant was induced by government
agents to engage in the proscribed activity and no conviction may be had.13 7 This
is inconsistent not only with the Supreme Court cases 8 and other circuits,39 but
also with a 1955 decision of the same circuit, which sets forth the correct rule,
that "a suspected criminal may be offered an opportunity to transgress in such
a manner as is usual .. ." 40 in similar circumstances. It is well settled that the
"inducement" which must be asserted by the accused is that which will tend to
show that the criminal conduct was the "product of the creative activity" of the
law-enforcement officials,41 that he was "lured" into its commission,42 and would
not otherwise have committed the crime,43 or that the government agent's conduct
is acceptable if he merely affords an opportunity to a person of ready willingness
and complaisance to enter into the unlawful transaction. 4
Government agents may only do enough to "reveal the criminal design" 45
of would-be violators of the law. Courts have held that there is no entrapment as
a matter of law, and that the issue will therefore not be submitted to the jury
where the only allegation is that the defendant sold narcotics to government
agents,4 6 or that he made the sale to government agents without asking any ques-
tions inimediately after the agent asked him if he had any narcotics.4 7 The suspect
may be offered an opportunity to transgress in such manner as is usual in the given
type of violation, 48 and this must involve no more persuasion than is necessary in
the course of an ordinary sale."0 There is no quarrel with the use of a "decoy"
or so-called "special employee," usually an addict himself, who, in the usual case,
contacts the suspect and purchases from him narcotics with marked money furnished
by the authorities.50 In all such cases, it is apparent that there is already formed
in the mind of the defendant an intent and purpose to violate the law, and that no
more than an "opportunity" is being furnished. For this reason, it would not be
correct to say that the crime itself is the result of the creative activity of the police.
There is no entrapment where a defendant joins a conspiracy to smuggle
35 See United States v. Silva, supra note 33 at 558; People v. Strong, 21 Ill.2d 320, 172
N.E.2d 765 (1961).
36 261 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1959).
37 Id. at 911, citing United States v. Sherman, 240 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1957).
38 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorreils v. United States, 287 U.S.
435 (1932).
39 See United States v. Markham, 191 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1951).
40 Hamilton v. United States, 221 F.2d 611, 614 (5th Gir. 1955). See Rodriguez v. United
States, 227 F.2d 912, 914 (5th Cir. 1955):
It is not important.., that the Government sets the stage and provides the
aid, incentive and opportunity for the commission of the crime, for the
defense of entrapment fails unless it appears that the defendant has done
that which she would never have done had it not been for the urgings" and
encouragements of the Government's agent.
41 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
42 Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 340 U.S. 877 (1950);
Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921).
43 Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1951).
44 Park v. United States, 283 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1960).
45 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
46 United States v. Markam, 191 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1951).
47 Sandoval v. United States, 285 F.2d'605 (10th Cir. 1960).
48 Hamilton v. United States, 221 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1955).
49 Ibid. See People v. Hutcherson, 197 Cal. App.2d, 17 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1961).
50 Louie Hung v. United States, 111 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1940); People v. Branch, 119
Cal. App.2d 490, 260 P.2d 27 (1953).
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narcotics into the country after acquiring full knowledge of the criminal plan
from an agent posing as a man of some wealth interested in buying large quantities
of narcotics. 51 The mere use of deceitful "artifice and stratagem"52 is not ob-
jectionable, since the law does not mean to "protect the guilty from the consequences
of subjectively mistaking apparent for actual opportunity to safely commit crime." 53
Thus an agent may fabricate a complete and plausible story about his identity,
occupation, and dealings in narcotics, and also create an atmosphere of social friend-
ship by conversation unrelated to narcotics as a prelude to soliciting the commission
of a narcotics offense.54 There is clearly no entrapment when the accused is the
one who solicits the commission of the crime, for inducement cannot then be
seriously alleged.
55
Once the defendant sustains the burden of raising the issue, of showing some
evidence of illegal entrapment, then the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the government's activity did not amount to en-
trapment,5 6 by testimony of its agents and an examination of the accused. Usually
the product will be a question of credibility to be answered by the trier of fact-
the word of the accused against the word of the government agents and informers
as to what actually took place.57 If the version of the prosecution's witnesses is un-
contradicted, however, the jury will not even be instructed on the defense,"' nor
if defendant's counsel merely claims there is entrapment, without offering any
evidence. 59 But whenever there is conflicting testimony and credibility is involved,
the trial court must submit the issue to -the jury.60 One state has said that en-
trapment is not established as a matter of law where there is any substantial evidence
in the record from which it may be inferred that the criminal intent to commit the
particular offense originated in the mind of the accused.
61
When the burden has been shifted to the government to show that the de-
fendant has not been entrapped, it may, according to Sorrells, subject the de-
fendant to an "appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and pre-
disposition as bearing upon that issue," since his "predisposition and criminal
design ... are relevant" to show that he is not one who is "otherwise innocent."6 2
The government must show that it has trapped an unwary criminal rather than an
unwary innocent. On this point the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in Young v.
United States6 3 has apparently clarified the Sherman decision. The court rejected
the contention that entrapment is established as a matter of law where there is no
evidence that defendant was ever a user, or had a criminal record, or made any
profit from the sales in question. The court said,
Although there is language in Sherman v. United States, supra, and
Morales v. United States, 1958, 260 F.2d 939, which would indicate that
such evidence or lack of it is important in considering whether there is
entrapment, we do not feel that we can say that such a record establishes
51 Walker v. United States, 298 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1962).
52 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932).
53 Marshall v. United States, 258 F.2d 94,97 (10th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds,
360 U.S. 310 (1959).
54 Marshall v. United States, supra note 53.
55 United States v. Parker, 217 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1954); Rosso v. United States, 1 F.2d
717 (3d Cir. 1924). See United States v. Sizer, 292 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1961), holding that
where defendant solicited the first sale, and the government thereafter afforded him opportu-
nities to make further sales, conviction on subsequent sales was not precluded where defendant's
arrest was not unduly delayed and delay was due to an attempt to discover his source of supply.
56 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
57 Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958); Lufty v. United States, 198 F.2d 760
(9th Cir. 1952).
58 Hester v. United States, 303 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1962).
59 Fletcher v. United States, 295 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
60 Walker v. United States, 298 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1962).
61 People v. Terry, 44 Cal.2d 371, 372-3, 282 P.2d 19, 20 (1955).
62 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
63 286 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1960).
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entrapment as a matter of law. Most of this evidence is negative evidence.
It can be argued that it might tend to show that there was entrapment.
If, however, this court should hold that it is necessary for the government
to show some or all of these facts (prior addiction, criminal record, sales
profit) in order to escape the defense of entrapment, it would in effect give
the narcotic peddler "one free shot" before he could be convicted for his
crimes.
6 4
The lower federal courts have developed a number of tests to aid in the de-
termination of whether or not the defendant is an "unwary criminal" whose claim
of entrapment has no merit. First, courts may say that the offense can be found to
have originated in the mind of the defendant, and that the government is merely
affording him an opportunity to commit a particular violation in a course of
proscribed conduct in which he is continuously engaged.6 5 There are a number
of cases involving doctors giving illegal prescriptions for narcotics where it is
shown that the doctor has often done so before for other persons,
6 6 or for the person
who becomes a government informer for the purpose of a particular purchase
with marked money.6 7 Such previous activities will tend to discredit the defendant
when he claims that he has been illegally entrapped in the case at bar.
Secondly, and closely related, is the test of the defendant's "predisposition" to
commit the crime. It is said that there is no illegal entrapment where the defendant
is found to have had a general intention to commit such an offense as the one
charged whenever the opportunity was presented.
68 Such a finding by the jury
warrants its rejection of the defense of entrapment, 69 because such a general in-
tention and a claim of entrapment are inconsistent. The defendant's predisposition
may be apparent or inferable from the facts, as, for example, where he already
has possession of narcotics, and the action of the government is little more than
arranging to have agents present to detect the commission of a crimeT or where,
even though the informer represents to the accused that he is ill and needs nar-
cotics, the accused readily gets them for him.7 1 A previous illegal sale may be
shown to demonstrate this predisposition, and to explain defendant's hesitancy as
only that which is natural to one acquainted with the narcotics trade.
7 2 This need
only be similar criminal conduct, however, and not identical, in order to be
relevant.7 3 Likewise, a criminal record7 4 is relevant to a showing of "predisposition"
64 Id. at 15.
65 Cratty v. United States, 163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1947); United States v. Brandenburg,
162 F.2d 980 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 769 (1947).
66 United States v. Abdallah, 149 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 724 (1945).
67 United States v. Brandenburg, 162 F.2d 980 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 769
(1947). But it is not true that simply because a defendant has been guilty of narcotics violations
before, he may be entrapped. Cf. Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
However, it may be that in an extreme case "the conceded volume of the defendant's business
of this type is so conclusive of his intent that the entrapment defense does not call for serious
consideration." Simmons v. United States, 300 Fed. 321, 322 (6th Cir. 1924). See Fisk v.
United States, 279 Fed. 12 (6th Cir. 1922).
68 Demos v. United States, 205 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1953).
69 Ibid.
70 Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844 (1948).
71 Price v. United States, 56 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1932).
72 Trent v. United States, 284 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 889 (1961).
For a different and stronger rule see Sullivan v. United States, 219 F.2d 760, 761 (D.C. Cir.
1955), holding that where defendant delivered narcotics in the morning to an addict who
became an "agent" of the government for purposes of a sale in the afternoon, "this precludes
any finding of entrapment with respect to the afternoon transaction." (But there is no reason
why the two factors, sale in the morning and entrapment in the afternoon, should be absolutely
mutually exclusive.)
73 United States v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1951); Nero v. United States, 189
F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1951); Cratty v. United States, 163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
74 Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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to commit the crime, though it certainly is not so weighty as to preclude the de-
fense of entrapment.75
A third often-repeated formula is that there is no illegal entrapment by the
police where the manner in which the sale is made indicates a "ready complaisance"
on the part of the defendant.7 6 Easy acquiescence or ready complaisance appears
to be by definition incompatible with a claim of being induced to commit a crime
that would never otherwise have been committed.
7 7
Some courts have said that the government must have reasonable grounds
to suspect that the defendant is engaged in or about to engage in an illegal act be-
fore he may be invited by a government agent to do so. 7 Thus, in Mitchell v. United
States7 9 the court said that where the government has reasonable cause to believe
that defendant is violating the law, he may be legally entrapped by decoy letters
or pretended purchases. One objection to this statement is that the mere use of
decoy letters or pretended purchases is not in and of itself sufficient to establish
entrapment.8 0 And, by definition, entrapment is never legal. It is submitted that
the reason for the reasonable cause requirement is not a conscious rejection of the
approach of the Supreme Court in both Sorrells and Sherman, which viewed the
defense of entrapment as an assertion going more to the extent of the defendant's
culpability than to police methods. It seems likely, rather, that courts began to think
of "reasonable cause" as an absolute requirement only after having at first viewed
it as merely one factor which would rebut a claim of entrapment. Such confusion
appears in the following language from Heath v. United States,"' a case involving
illegal sales of liquor:
It is well recognized that officers may entrap one into the commission of an
offense only when they have reasonable grounds to believe that he is en-
gaged in unlawful activities. They may not initiate the intent and purpose
of the violation. In a case of entrapment, it is incumbent on the government
to prove reasonable grounds to believe that the intent and purpose to
violate the law existed in the mind of the accused.
2
But "the crux of the issue is not the reasonableness of the suspicion by the police,
but the methods used."8' 3 The better rule is stated in Silva v. United States:
Even though an accused had no previous criminal record and the officers
were not shown to have knowledge of a predisposition on his part to commit
a crime, still if the jury believed that the felonious intent and purpose
were present at the time of the act they would be free to reject the ac-
cused's claim of entrapment. There is always a first time wilfully to engage
in criminal conduct.84
75 Id. at 222: "[R]eadiness or predisposition is not established by evidence that the person
is not 'innocent' in that he has a criminal record," although it is relevant. In Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), other facts enabled the Court to hold that there was entrapment
as a matter of law. Defendant's criminal record was relevant but not conclusive.
76 Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958); Fletcher v. United States, 295 F.2d
179 (D.C. Cir. 1961); People v. Toler, 26 Ill.2d 100, 185 N.E.2d 874 (1962).
77 The unfortunate wording of the tests in a number of cases may be traceable to Judge
Hand's opinion in United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933), where he spoke of
these tests as "excuses" that somehow justify entrapment. Whereas these factors (an existing
course of similar criminal conduct, an already-formed design to commit the crime, and a ready
complaisance to commit the crime) properly go to show that the defendant was not "induced"
but only "afforded opportunities," somehow in Jasso v. United States, 290 F.2d 671 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S..858 (1961), it is held that the offering of inducements is proper
where these elements are found. Hearsay is admissible on these matters. Trice v. United States,
211 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1954).
78 Childs v. United States, 267 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 948 (1959);
Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1954).
79 143 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1944).
80 Ibid.
81 169 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1948).
82 Id. at 1010.
83 People v. Wells, 25 Ill.2d 146, 182 N.E.2d 689, 691 (1962).
84 212 F.2d 422, 424 (9th Cir. 1954).
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In showing this "reasonable cause," evidence as to former convictions, 5 reputa-
tion, 6 complaints,8 7 and personal observations by government officialss are all
relevant. These are circumstances which other courts have said go to rebut a claim
of entrapment, since they are relevant in showing a "predisposition" to commit
the crime.
Although the defense of entrapment is raised when the defendant pleads not
guilty,89 if he denies the doing of the very act which constitutes the crime, the
defense is not available.8 0 In Crisp v. United States,91 however, the accused testified
that he received no money and did not hand the narcotics to the officers, but that
they were snatched from his hand by the officers. It was held that this assertion
did not preclude the accused from claiming the defense of entrapment, and that
it was proper to submit to the jury these alternative defenses.92 The holding seems
sound. Where the defendant does not deny participation in the alleged act, but
claims that the transaction was not a sale, and that even if it was, he was entrapped
because of the encouragement of police officers, he is not being inconsistent or
illogical. He is merely insisting that even though he was induced to act as he did,
there is still a question as to whether his conduct would be criminal in the absence
of entrapment. But a defendant impeaches himself when he claims 1) that he
had no part in the alleged crime, and 2) that he was entrapped and therefore
ought not be punished for its commission.
Finally, it is essential to establishing the defense of entrapment that the in-
ducement be through or because of the acts of a government "agent" or "officer."
93
But it is not necessary that the law enforcement officials have knowledge of the
methods being employed by these "agents" or informers.9 4 The courts have treated
as government agents both paid informers and those acting under promise of
immunity from prosecution.95
There is no doubt that the possibilities of abuse inherent in the use of in-
formers in narcotics arrest cases are great. However, it seems they are a necessary
part of law enforcement techniques in such secret crimes as narcotics laws violations.
Rather than dispensing with them, it is preferable to secure greater control over
the actions of informers and law enforcement officers, who may often care only about
securing the arrest and conviction of the person suspected, and may use any and
all means at his disposal to effect the arrest. An officer or informer may coax and
attempt to persuade a suspect to commit a crime in any of the various ways that
have been held to constitute entrapment. He may even be the cause of the ad-
85 E.g., Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1952).
86 See United States v. Valdes, 229 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 996 (1956).
87 Heath v. United States, 169 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1948).
88 Nero v. United States, 189 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1951); Mitchell v. United States, 143
F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1944).
89 Rodriguez v. United States, 227 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1955). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(a):
Pleadings in criminal proceedings shall be the indictment and the informa-
tion, and the pleas of not guilty, guilty, and nolo contendere. All other pleas,
and demurrers and motions to quash are abolished, and defenses and
objections raised before trial which heretofore could have been raised by
one or more of them shall be raised only by motion to dismiss or to grant
appropriate relief, as provided in these rules.
90 Brown v. United States, 261 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1958); Rodriguez v. United States,
227 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1955); People v. Johnson, 99 Cal.App.2d 559, 222 P.2d 58 (1950).
Contra: Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
91 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1958).
92 Id. at 70.
93 Ivy v. State, 161 Tex.Crim.App. 371, 277 S.W.2d 712 (1955).
94 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
95 See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Pro-
vocateurs, 60 YALE L. J. 1091, 1109 (1951), note 53 and accompanying text. See also the
dissent in Jones v. United States, 266 F.2d 924, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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diction of the accused, as in United States v. Silva.9 6 The dissent in Jones v. United
States97 makes these facts clear:
... [I]t is to be expected that the informer will not infrequently reach for
shadowy leads, or even seek to incriminate the innocent. The practice of
paying fees to the informer for the cases he makes may also be expected,
from time to time, to induce him to lure non-users into the drug habit
and then entrap them into law violations.98
As the Supreme Court has said, "law enforcement does not require methods such
as this." 99
One state, Colorado, holds that entrapping authorities are guilty of
conspiracy. 00 Other judicial weapons may be now being forged to help deal with
the problem. In United States v. Place,101 the court found there was no evidence
of entrapment and upheld the conviction. The defendants contended that the
government's informer, in providing defendant with narcotics for his personal use
precluded prosecution for the crimes committed by defendants which followed so
shortly. The court held that the doctrine that "the government ought not to use
evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act" did not apply here be-
cause there was no close causal relationship between the illegal conduct and the
evidence obtained.10 2 Defendant attempted to show on trial that he would have been
physically unable to bring about the sale prosecuted for without the stimulation of
the narcotics which the agent provided for him. But the Court of Appeals said
that there was enough other uncontradicted evidence so that it would have been
capricious to find that this act by the agent caused defendant's $300 sale less than
24 hours later or was a clue that led to the evidence of that sale. In a proper case,
however, this rule, if applied, could provide an additional effective check to im-
proper police action which may or may not have any bearing on the defendant's
culpability, but is at least totally unnecessary and abhorrent in itself.
Another court has undertaken to regulate the qualifications of informers used
by the police. Over a dissenter's objection that since, in almost all cases, informers
are on a contingent basis, the holding will "rob the Government of one of its
most effective weapons in detecting crime and bringing to the bar of justice those
who commit it,' 0'1 the Fifth Circuit held that:
Without some such justification or explanation [that "Government
investigators had such certain knowledge" of the criminal activities of the
defendants or "carefully instructed" the informer on the rules against
entrapment], we cannot sanction a contingent fee agreement to produce
evidence against particular named defendants as to crimes not yet com-
mitted. Such an arrangement might tend to a "frame up," or to cause
an informer to induce or persuade innocent persons to commit crimes which
they had no previous intent or purpose to commit. The opportunities for
abuse are too obvious to require elaboration. 04
The courts have done a great deal to curtail the evils which may arise from
the use of the police methods necessitated by the nature of the illegal narcotics
traffic in this country. The rules concerning entrapment are generally reasonable and
consistent with the theoretical basis of the defense as the Supreme Court has
stated it, although some cases have involved a misunderstanding of the concept of
"inducement'' s in the formula, and others have said that before the police may
96 180 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See supra, note 33 and accompanying text.
97 266 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
98 Id. at 928.
99 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958).
100 Reigan v. People, 120 Colo. 472, 210 P.2d 991 (1949).
101 263 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1959).
102 Id. at 630, quoting the dissent of Holmes in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
469-470 (1928).
103 Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1962).
104 Id. at 444. (Material in BRACKETS added.)
105 Cf., supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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secure arrests through the use of informers they must have "reasonable cause" to
suspect that a person is engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity, or else
there is entrapment. 106 Although this may be a reasonable and desirable requirement
with which to limit police activity, it cannot be said to be a necessary part or
corollary to the theory of entrapment, which turns on the nature of the defendant's
conduct primarily, and only on police conduct insofar as it reveals the probable na-
ture of the act of the accused. Rather than an unwise overreaction to the problems
of control over police activity, such as, for example, barring prosecution whenever
the Government is a party to one of these illegal transactions, judicially created
limitations will emerge and develop, slowly and in appropriate instances, 07 as
courts come to apprehend the defense of entrapment to be alone insufficient to
protect defendants and to curtail improper police activity.
Lawrence J. Gallick
106 Cf., supra note 77 and accompanying text.
107 Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Place,
263 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1959); Reigan v. People, 120 Colo. 472, 210 P.2d 991 (1949).
